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Abstract
The aim of this work is to test whether publicly available companies from Kaza-
khstan follow the pecking order theory of capital structure in their financial deci-
sions. We defined the importance of the financial leverage ratio as a key coeffi-
cient demonstrating financial stability of the company. The financial reports of the
biggest companies were used to identify the independent variables which become
the determinants of capital structure choice. Results of econometric analysis par-
tially confirmed the predicted hypotheses of the relationship between leverage ra-
tio and determinants. Overall, the outcomes of this work assist financial managers
in terms of financial risk management and strategical decision making in defining
the capital structure of the firm.
1 Introduction
In the modern economies many projects are financed by external sources when
companies are taking loans to finance their current expenses. The value of liabil-
ities affects company in terms of risk management, strategic planning, expected
revenue and seniority of the capital structure in case of bankruptcy.
Studies of companies operating in developing capital markets have only just
begun to appear and have not yet led to any lasting results either in terms of the
determinants of the capital structure or in terms of the motives determining the
management’s hierarchy of the source of funding. The choice of Kazakhstan as a
subject of research gives us an excellent example of middle-income economy.
In this research we want to answer the following question: do the compa-
nies from Kazakhstan follow the pecking order theory in their financial decisions?
Our main goal is to check if our results are in line with various researchers who
tested pecking order hypotheses on different data sets from different countries.
We adopted the methodology of testing pecking order theory on unique data set,
moreover I have not found any similar published works on the example of Kaza-
khstan.
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This study is important because it may help managers of the tested companies
to maximize their values by following the main findings of pecking order theory.
2 Theory and Literature Review
Considering the importance of the choice of capital structure in financial stability
of the company, the big amount of both theoretical and empirical researches had
been done. The theoretical basis of capital structure and the pecking order the-
ory is described in this part while empirical findings are presented in the section
concerning the determinants. The formation of the capital structure is a primary
focus of researchers in the field of financial economics. The capital structure is the
aggregate of the company’s financial resources from various sources of financing.
There are internal and external sources of financing the operational and capital ex-
penditures for the company. Retained earnings, net profit, current assets (cash),
fixed assets (account receivable or equipment which can be easily converted to
cash) and owners’ investments are the examples of internal financing. Bank loans,
bonds and shares issued, venture capital and state aid are the major sources of
external financing.
The early Modigliani-Miller (1958) theory claims that both internal and exter-
nal sources of financing projects cost the same amount in a model with perfect
competition and without differences in taxation and transaction costs. But, the
proposition of irrelevance of capital structure does not work due to the existence
of the costs of financing. The presence of corporate taxes, information asymmetry
and bankruptcy costs are the main examples of costs. The same Modigliani-Miller
(1963) published the second work in which the tax on corporations was introduced
into the original model. Considering the existence of taxation, it was shown that
higher proportion of borrowed capital will cause higher share price. However,
from a certain point, the value of the firm begins to decline because a riskier debt
compensates the saving on corporate tax payments. Myers and Majluf (1984) have
found that the information asymmetry problem is appearing when the corporation
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managers can accurately know the true values of the company’s current financial
position while investors not owning data on the internal state of the company can
only assume possible values of the company’s revenues. Companies would pre-
fer to issue debt rather than to issue securities when external financing is neces-
sary. This happens because the information costs associated with debt issuance are
lower than the costs associated with the issue of shares. Finally, all these conclude
about the prevalence of internal over external sources of funding that in general
can be explained by the higher cost of external financing. And this prevalence tells
us about the existence of hierarchy of sources of financing.
Myers and Majluf (1984) demonstrated that due to the existence of such costs
companies prefer internal financing rather that outside investments. The pecking
order theory of capital structure is one of the most influential theories that explain
the existence of this hierarchy. If the company has received a net profit this year
management will send it to pay off the existing debt load, then to cover operational
costs or invest in new profitable projects and finally will pay dividend payments in
the last order. The hierarchy of financing assumes that managers use to take loans
or issue bonds only when they spend all internal sources of funding. If domestic
sources are not enough management implements the liquid securities available to
the company in the first order. In case of shortage of funds, the company will resort
to external sources by the following order: first, by taking bank loans; second,
by issuing hybrid financial instruments (preferred shares, convertible bonds, etc.),
and only as a last resort to issue ordinary shares. It turns out that the company
adheres to a certain order of financing that is the basis of the pecking order theory.
We can use the conclusions of the model of Shiam-Sander and Myers (1999),
which shows how companies select funding sources in the event of a shortage of
resources. If the company has enough equity, then there is no shortage of sources
of financing. Company follow the pecking order theory if it does not have its
own sources and there is a deficit which forces the managers to borrow money
and only in extreme cases to the issue the shares. Shiam-Sander and Myers have
found strong support of this theory based on sampling of 157 American companies
4
whose shares were analyzed during the period of 17 years. Pecking order theory is
proposed as an empirical a model of corporate leverage. Thus, there is no optimal
structure of capital and an accurately defined ratio of debt and equity. The forma-
tion of the capital structure depends on the company’s preferences regarding the
choice of one or another source and the funding hierarchy is associated with the
asymmetry of information.
Frank and Goyal (2002) suggested to use regression of leverage and used the
obtained results information about companies in describing the financing gap of
the pecking order theory. The empirical analysis is based on the leverage regres-
sion which was based on four independent factors: the tangibility of assets, value
of assets to book value, the log of sales and profitability.
3 Determinants
After considering the key postulates of pecking order theory we will define the
determinants that explain the capital structure decisions. The description, for-
mula, relationship with the dependent variable as well as the confirmative em-
pirical work are provided of each determinant. Finally, we will set a hypothesis
regarding each determinant’s relationship with the dependent variable.
3.1 Leverage
The coefficient of financial leverage is the ratio of debt to total liabilities chosen by
the company to solve long-term problems from its strategy. Generally, enterprises
form a financial leverage to increase the return on their funds invested in the busi-
ness. The equal ratio of debt to total liabilities is considered optimal which means
the coefficient of financial leverage is 0.5. While in large public companies this
ratio can be close to 1. But, company may lose its financial independence and its
financial position becomes extremely unstable in case of large values of the lever-
age coefficient. It is become more difficult for such organizations to get additional
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loans. Practice has demonstrated that the most common value of the coefficient
is 0.6 or 60% of borrowed capital and 40% of own capital. Meanwhile, using bor-
rowed capital company can simultaneously increase or decrease the return of own
capital. The increase or decrease of return on equity depends on average cost of
borrowed capital (average percent rate) and allows to measure the effectiveness
of the company in choice of sources of financing. So, we see that debt is dynamic
component. We use the financial leverage as a dependent variable because we as-
sociate the change of dept-to-equity ratio with the determinants described above
and these relationships will be analyzed in each determinants’ description.
Frank and Goyal (2002) suggested to use regression of leverage and used the
obtained results information about companies in describing the financing gap of
the pecking order theory. There is no single formula to calculate the financial lever-
age ratio, so we need to analyze several approaches by various authors. The most
common type of leverage was proposed by de Jong (2010) as total debt to total lia-
bilities ratio. Titman and Wessels (1988) used six interpretations in their empirical
analysis, but we will count leverage as a long-term debt divided by book value of
liabilities.
3.2 Tangibility
Tangibility - the structure of the assets, expressed in fixed assets divided by total
assets.
The structure of the assets can influence the choice of capital structure. Fixed
assets cannot be fast convertible into liquid assets which can be used as a source of
financing. The prevalence of fixed assets does not allow companies to rely on inter-
nal financing. So, companies need to take external loans and increase the leverage
ratio. The pecking order hypothesis regarding the negative influence of tangibility
was demonstrated by Mazur (2007) on the example of Polish companies.
Hypothesis 1: tangibility will have negative relationship to the leverage ratio.
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3.3 Profitability
We calculate profitability of the company as a value of earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to the percentage of total assets.
The indicator is useful in comparing companies of one industry but differing
in capital structure. At the same time, investment size, debt level or the tax regime
are not important - only the type of activity and operational results matter. Thus,
this coefficient allows to analyze firms with various accounting policies (for ex-
ample, in terms of accounting for depreciation or revaluation of assets), various
taxation conditions or the level of debt level. A more profitable company has more
opportunities to enter the financial markets. At the same time, after taking off the
depreciation value we are not clear about the company’s real need for investment.
Companies with high amortization value such as oil and gas or mining companies
which consist most of the economy of Kazakhstan are interested in actively using
this indicator. These companies can overestimate their results since the adjustment
to depreciation significantly improves their profit.
More profitable companies have higher earnings which they can use to finance
their future operational and capital costs. It will lead that company will have lower
possibility to take additional risk by relying on loans or issuing shares according
to pecking order theory. The empirical finding of such relationship was found by
Kaur and Rao (2009) on the example of Indian companies.
Hypothesis 2: profitability will have a negative relationship to leverage raito.
3.4 EBITDA margin
This ratio is calculated as EBITDA (Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation
and amortization) divided by total revenue.
The purpose of this indicator is to determine the percentage of profit from the
turnover of the company for a certain period not including in the calculation of
expenses for taxes and credit interest. EBITDA shows the company’s profit be-
fore various payments. These payments are either delayed for some time and this
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money can be repeatedly used by the company. Companies do not have to pay
interest for these payments or in the case of depreciation money does not leave the
company at all which allows them to be used in the future.
Mazur (2007) has found a positive relationship between leverage and EBITDA
margin. We also expect positive influence of the EBITDA margin to the leverage
ratio. Higher value of this indicator means that companies will prefer internal
financing, and this assumption follows the pecking order theory.
Hypothesis 3: EBITDA margin has positive influence of to the leverage ratio.
3.5 Asset utilization
Asset utilization is measured as the revenue divided by total assets.
Asset utilization or turnover is a financial indicator of the intensity of the or-
ganization’s use of the entire set of available assets. As assets equals liabilities in
the balance sheet, we can call this coefficient a liability turnover as well. The abil-
ity of a company to quickly repay its debts is a factor demonstrating the financial
stability of this firm. Generally, the companies with a higher revenue to assets ra-
tio can easier meet its debt payments. On the other hand, low level of turnover
will increase the possibility of bankruptcy. Firms in this case will take more debt
to avoid financial difficulties and this will increase the leverage ratio. Also, higher
revenues mean higher undistributed earnings in total which will lead the company
to rely on internal sources. All these factors tell us about the negative relationship
between asset utilization coefficient and the financial leverage ratio.
In the work of Kaur and Rao (2009) we have found that firm will follow the
pecking order theory if it has an appropriate ratio of net earnings which can be
used to finance future projects and the management is not willing to pay dividends
in the current period. The findings of Kaur and Rao (2009) have direct confirm of
the negative relationship between asset utilization and leverage in their empirical
study.
Hypothesis 4: asset utilization has negative influence on the leverage ratio.
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3.6 Dividend policy
This coefficient is found as ratio of dividends paid by the total equity value.
The higher coefficient of dividends paid means that companies have less op-
portunities to finance their projects using own resources. This will increase the
dependence from external financing. Authors as Al-Najjar (2011) have found that
dividends play an unimportant role in capital structure while the correlation be-
tween leverage and dividends was significant. But, when Mazur (2007) divided
companies which pay dividends, and which doesn’t he has found that companies
which regularly pay dividends fully support hierarchy in capital structure.
We need to consider that many of tested companies in Kazakhstan are owned
by the national fund “Samruk Kazyna” which is controlled by the government.
This means that they will follow the dividend policy of the national fund and in
majority of cases the number of dividends will be equal the amount of net profit.
Hypothesis 5: dividend policy will have positive relationship with the leverage
ratio.
3.7 Free cash flow
Free cash flow (FCF) ratio is equal to ne t changes in cash flow from all three finan-
cial activities (operational, investing and financial) in cash flow statement to the
total assets in balance sheet.
This net cash can be used to finance new projects or to increase the value of the
company by increasing own capital. FCF is the first available source of external
financing and the higher value of FCF the lower leverage ratio will be. Lopez-
Garcia and Sogorb-Mira (2008) used net operational cash flow to total assets ratio
to check the pecking order hypothesis on the example of Spanish companies. These
authors in their study defined negative influence of FCF and proved that Spanish
firms prefer to finance their projects using internal sources rather that external.
Hypothesis 6: FCF will have negative relationship with the leverage ratio.
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3.8 Liquidity
Liquidity is measured as the coefficient of current assets to the current liabilities in
balance sheet.
Liquidity is the ability of a company to pay its short-term obligations by real-
izing its current assets. The task of analyzing the liquidity of the balance sheet is
necessary for understanding the creditworthiness of the firm or its ability to fully
settle for all its liabilities. The analysis of the liquidity consists in comparing the
assets grouped according to the degree of their ability to be sold with liabilities
grouped by the terms of their redemption and distributed by their increasing ma-
turity.
Myers and Rajan (1998) considering the principles of pecking order theory con-
cluded that firms with higher amount of liquid assets can use these resources to
finance their projects and not take costly external obligations. The rise of liquid-
ity will lower the leverage ratio, so this result show that liquidity had negative
relationship with leverage ratio. We set a hypothesis of a negative relationship
between liquidity and leverage ratio.
Hypothesis 7: negative relationship between liquidity and leverage ratio.
3.9 Size
We will estimate the book value of the company’s size by taking natural logarithm
of the total assets in balance sheet.
The pecking order theory states that bigger firms will tend to have higher lever-
age ratio rather that small companies. Usually big companies are more diversified
and have higher rates of borrowed capital because they are not allowed to finance
all projects only with external sources due to lack of it. In contrast, small com-
panies have higher profits ratio and prefer to rely on own resources according to
Myers and Majluf (1984). Hypothesis 8: size has negative influence on the leverage
ratio.
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3.10 Ownership
This dummy variable is equal to 1 if the company is state owned and zero if it is
private.
The most of big companies in Kazakhstan are state owned (national) especially
in such industries as oil and gas, mining or railways. Being state company means
that company may hope for external financing rather than relying only on its own.
The board of state-owned companies in case of financial difficulties may count
on government support. External financing becomes much easier if company is
supported by the government. In contrast, private companies cannot rely on cheap
external financing and they prefer to use internal resources. This is example of the
reverse of pecking order theory.
Hypothesis 9: state ownership has negative influence on the leverage ratio.
4 Data
The main source of data in implementing my research is the financial statements
of publicly traded companies. Companies are obliged to publish financial state-
ments every quarter and the final report at the end of a year. Generally, financial
data is audited, and it is a reason why we can trust this data. There are 4 basic
financial statement: balance sheet, income statement, statement of cash flows and
statement of retained earnings. All determinants can be calculated using only the
information of financial statements.
I have used four sources of information to collect financial statements. First
is the website of Kazakhstan’s Stock Exchange kase.kz which is considered reli-
able because it collects only audited financial reports from local public companies.
Second, I looked for the financial information from official websites of the com-
panies where they publish all commercial data. The third is Bloomberg where I
have found the financial information of the biggest companies. And finally, the
forth source of financial information is the London Stock Exchange (LSE), where
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I collected the financial statements of Kazakhstani companies. There are only 5
publicly traded companies in LSE originally from Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan Stock Exchange (KASE) was founded in 1993 and is the main capi-
tal market for companies from Kazakhstan. The capitalization of companies repre-
sented in KASE grew constantly and in 10-year period of survey increased by 64%.
In 2007 the capitalization of share market reached 7 569 billion KZT and by 2016 it
rose till 12 401 billion KZT. In total, there are 130 companies listed in KASE in 2016.
Considering the specific formation of the capital structure by financial sector
companies and the real estate industry the companies representing these industries
were not included. For example, the capital structure of banking companies is
regulated by Basel agreements and in general the level of debt is several times
higher than in companies in other spheres. Out of total 130 companies listed in
KASE 30 are banks and 17 are financial organizations which cannot be counted in
my research. The market capitalization of banks and other financial companies in
KASE is about 4 700 billion KZT or 38% of all KASE capitalization.
I formed a sample of the 46 largest companies from different spheres in Kaza-
khstan. These companies represent about 90% of capitalization of non-financial
market of KASE while the market cost of these companies equal 7 trillion KZT. All
companies have a long-term credit rating below BBB+ according to Standard and
Poor’s credit rating scale and consider as speculative level companies. This rating
tells investors that company is solvent but unfavorable economic conditions may
adversely affect the possibility of payments.
Moreover, there are several companies that have business and main assets in
Kazakhstan but listed in foreign stock exchanges. Many of these companies are
listing debt securities, but there are some which could make IPO and trade their
shares in LSE. IPO in LSE allows companies to attract large amounts of money
than in KASE. Business valuation in the case of a freely traded company is usually
higher as well as publicly traded shares are more liquid. In addition, the listing
of the world’s largest exchanges like LSE is very prestigious. The market capi-
talization of 5 companies that are listed in LSE from Kazakhstan origin is equal
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approximately to 8 billion pounds.
The selected data is taken in the period from 2007 till 2016. This ten-year period
covers the most interesting part of Kazakhstan’s economic history when the econ-
omy was booming, and we can estimate the effect of financial crisis (2008-2009)
and economic crisis (2014-2016).
The represented data is not balanced panel of firms across years. There are
several companies which data are not presented on 10-year period. There are two
reasons of that: one part of companies was established after the beginning of my
survey and there are companies that did not presented financial reports during
some years. Generally, these companies are relatively small and works in the in-
dustries that become popular in Kazakhstan in several years such as telecommu-
nications or retail. In total I have collected financial data from 46 companies, but
I have only 451 observations. The unbalanced panel has no serious biases, for ex-
ample I can generalize the results by years and missed data in some years will not
create troubles from econometrical side.
5 Methodology
To test pecking order theory, we will follow the empirical model developed by
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). Their model is based on the leverage level and
the set of determinants that were used to analyze the debt-ratio relationships. We
also will use the regression of leverage but in our case, we will use more inde-
pendent variables described in determinants part. Our regressions are based on
panel data which means that the data applies for big variety of firms and belongs
to different time periods.
The set of independent variables in the regression are represented by the fol-
lowing equation:
xitβ = β1 · tangibilityit + β2 · pro f itabilityit + β3 · EBITDA_marginit+
+β4 · asset_utilizationit + β5 · dividendit + β6 · FCFit + β7 · liquidityit+
β8 · sizeit + β9 · stateit
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Regression levit with dependent variable and independent variables that both
include observed variables βxit that changes across time t and i which indicates
individual firms as well as unobserved component (unobserved heterogeneity) ci
and uit the idiosyncratic errors because these also changes across t and i.
levit = xitβ+ ci + uit
Using a model with the data only from one source which in our case is a finan-
cial report could lead to possible endogeneity problem. In fact, the variables like
profitability may impact leverage as well as leverage may form profitability. Af-
ter the analysis of determinants, we also defined that variables such as free cash
flow, size and asset utilization are also shape leverage and leverage impact them.
Also, we have defined that our unobserved component ci is correlated with xit or
Cov(xit, ci) 6= 0 which may cause serious problems. But, knowing that we have
panel data and can observe yt and xt at different time periods, and considering c is
time constant, we can solve this problem using sequential moment restrictions.
levit = xitβ+ ci + uit
levi,t−1 = xi,t−1β+ ci + ui,t−1
Then, we interpret the population regression function by:
E(uit|xit, xi,t−1, . . . , xi1, ci) = 0, t = 1, . . . , T
Which is equivalent to:
E(levit|xit, xi,t−1, . . . , xi1, ci) = βxit + ci
Considering this we see that after controlling xit and ci no past values of xit affect
the expected value of yit. We need to transform the initial regression to remove ci
and then find instrumental variables. Use the first difference method:
∆levit = ∆xitβ+ ∆uit, t = 2, . . . , T
Where ∆xit = xit − xi,t−1, ∆uit = uit − ui,t−1 and ∆levit = levit − levi,t−1
Now we get the following assumptions:
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E(x′isuit) = 0, s = 1, . . . , t
E(x′is∆uit) = 0, s = 1, . . . , t− 1
So, we can use the matrix zit as an instrumental for ∆xit, when zit = (xi1, ..., xi,t−1)
Considering that zit is not correlated with ∆uit we know that
E(Z′i∆ui) = 0
Where Zi is a matrix:
∆xi2 0 0 . . . 0
0 ∆xi3 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 . . . ∆xi,T−1
 =

zi2 0 0 . . . 0
0 zi3 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 . . . ziT

Where we can use all values from ∆xi3 to ∆xi,T−1 as the instrumental variables.
Then, this equation can be measured by pooled two stage least squares (2SLS)
method using the instruments above to solve the endogeneity problem.
Our variables are modeled as dependent on its own lag values, so the natural
extension to the autoregressive model is the vector autoregression. The results of
lag-order selection statistics for series of vector autoregressions are in Appendix 4.
We want to define separate regressions for governmental, non-governmental
companies as well as for companies from LSE. Then, we set separate regressions
as leverage of governmental companies - lev_gov, leverage of non-governmental
companies - lev_nongov, and finally lev_lse is for leverage of LSE companies.
levi = xiβ+ ui
lev_govi = xiβ+ ui
lev_nongovi = xiβ+ ui
lev_lsei = xiβ+ ui
We check the results of the regression by computing the Huber-White standard
errors to make sure that estimated standard errors are more robust.
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6 Results
In this part we interpret the main findings of the analysis of our data. The anal-
ysis consists of 2 main parts. First part includes descriptive statistics of determi-
nants, the analysis of industries and description of main financial data of “Samruk-
Kazyna”. And the second part includes the interpretation of OLS results where we
describe the results of each independent variable and its deviation from the pre-
dicted value. This comparison will show us the correctness of our hypotheses.
6.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 demonstrates the distribution of selected sample of companies into differ-
ent industries of economics. There are 12 industries in total with the highest num-
ber of represented companies were in metal processing industry (22%), oil and gas
sector (17%) and transport companies (11%). The attained result is not surprising
because economy of Kazakhstan is resource oriented when the most of big com-
panies are working in mining of resources. Also, a big branch of companies is
from food producing sector. Finally, these are several companies from industries
representing electro-engineering (4%) or chemical (2%) companies.
The summary of descriptive statistics is presented in Table 5. We have divided
this table into two parts: the description of dependent variables or different types
of leverage and the description of all independent variables.
The median values of almost all types of leverage are centered in 0.5 which
means that half of the companies have more liabilities in balance sheet while an-
other half prefer more equity. The received results are similar that was demon-
strated by Mazur (2007) where the author indicated that the mean value of lever-
age is around 52%. Moreover, it was interesting to measure that balance sheet of
several companies are totally consist of liabilities which means that their lever-
age ration is up to 0.99. A good example of such a company is “Atameken Agro”
where it has only 1% authorized capital as an equity and the rest 99% of balance
consist of debt. The situation is similar in other agricultural companies where the
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Table 1: Industry distribution
Industry Number of companies Fraction (%)
Metal 10 22%
Oil&Gas 8 17%
Transport 5 11%
Agriculture 4 9%
Energy 4 9%
Food 4 9%
Telecommunication 4 9%
Construction 3 7%
Electroengineering 2 4%
Chemicals 1 2%
Retail 1 2%
Total 46 100%
average leverage ratio is 86%. Such a dramatic situation happens because most
of agricultural companies are relying on subsidies from the state or banking loans
to cover past debts. At the same time companies in oil and gas or metal sectors
are having the lowest leverage ratios. The reason of that is the high profitability
of such sectors when these companies could finance their capital and operational
expenses using retained earnings.
The mean values of profitability, tangibility and EBITDA margin vary from
49 to 61% and tell about high profitability indicators of companies from Kaza-
khstan. This situation is typical for fast developing economies when Kazakhstan
has demonstrated 6-8% annual grows in 2000-2008 and 4-5% growth in 2010-2014.
A small number of companies had a negative net profits and only 14% of observa-
tions have negative value of profitability. Most of such companies are from agri-
culture sphere.
To understand the real financial situation in companies from real sector of eco-
nomics we will present the enlarged financial data of “Samruk-Kazyna” (SK) - the
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leading company in Kazakhstan which represent almost all governmental sector
and has a big share in the whole economy of Kazakhstan. Table 6 demonstrates
the financial reports of SK company as well as the total capitalization of KASE.
Public governmental companies which are listed in KASE are mainly but not all
represented by SK. The share of SK in total capitalization of KASE is large. It varies
from 18% till almost half of all KASE. It is interesting finding that the share of SK
rises in crisis years, for example in 2009 SK represented 43% and in 2014 49% of
total KASE capitalization. But when Kazakhstan’s economy starts growing again
the share of SK falls. The main reason of the rise of the SK share is instability of
other companies while SK grew linearly. These can be explained by various factors,
for example by industry problems, more professional management of SK, financial
management, appearance of new companies in KASE after the crisis and ctr., but
generally these reasons depend from company to company. In addition, in 2009
and 2015 KASE started the program of massive IPO when several big companies
started trading in KASE. This lead to fall the rate of SK.
The total balance sheet of SK is growing steadily. In 10 years of research total
assets grew in almost 3 times (288%) from 1 334 billion KZT till 3 838 billion KZT.
But this growth mainly happened due to the growth of liabilities especially in 2014-
2015 when SK decided to take additional loans to cover financial difficulties. The
value of equity also grew by 251% but liabilities grew more to 304%.
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Considering the income statement, the values of revenue demonstrated the
constant growth with some deceleration in 2009 and in 2013. But, overall, the rev-
enue grew by 317% in 10-year period which can be classified as an excellent result
even for developing economics. At the same time, the dynamics of net income had
not demonstrated stability. SK had a serious fall in net income in periods of crisis.
For example, the negative income occurred only in 2009, 2011 and 2014.
Despite the growth of revenue and asset, the index of net cash flow had demon-
strated some volatile fluctuations. In 2011 and 2013 there was a cash gap which
tells about serious problems in financial planning. Meanwhile, SK continued to
grow its capital expenditures (CAPEX) in 2007-2010 which become the reason of
cash gap but reducing the value of CAPEX in 2011 and 2012 this problem no more
occurred. The situation with dividends paid is interesting. The financial board
paid maximum dividends in inner-crisis period of 2010-2012 because financial sit-
uation was positive and there is no need to use the undistributed earnings in finan-
cial operations but reduces dividends in the periods of crisis when company need
additional money to cover financial problems. Finally, the situation with amortiza-
tion and depreciation remained stable in the whole period because neither finan-
cial decisions nor external situations cannot affect the level of amortization.
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6.2 Regression results
The regression results part includes results of four groups of companies. First
group includes the regression of total leverage covering all companies from our
list. Also, we divided all companies into two subgroups: first subgroup includes
only the companies under governmental rule, i.e. managed by “Samruk Kazyna”
while second subgroup contains remaining private companies. Finally, we ana-
lyzed separately Kazakhstani companies listed in London Stock Exchange (LSE).
Full results of this regression can be found in Table 4. In Table 2 we compare the
predicted and detected signs of these four regressions, where Reg 1 means the
findings of total leverage of all companies, Reg 2 – regression outcome of gov-
ernmental companies, Reg 3 – non-governmental companies and finally, Reg 4 –
results of companies listed in LSE.
The coefficient of determination for four types of regression explains less than
one third of dependency. R-squared for these regressions equals 27.4% for main
regression, 70.6% for state companies, 22.6% for non-state companies and 77.1%
for companies from LSE.
Table 2: Main, governmental, non-governmental and LSE regressions
Independent Variable Predicted Sign Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4
Tangibility - NS - NS -
Profitability - - - - NS
EBITDA margin + + NS + -
Asset utilization - - NS - -
Dividend policy + + + NS NS
Free cash flow - NS NS NS NS
Liquidity - - - - -
Size - NS + + +
Ownership - -
Tangibility
20
Long-term assets on average consist of 26% of total assets in companies from
Kazakhstan. The prevalence of short-term over long-term assets demonstrated
that companies can rely on own sources of financing which can lead the decrease
the leverage ratio and the correctness of the postulates of pecking order theory.
In fact, the tangibility results are negative for three groups of companies, but re-
gression results of main and non-governmental companies are not significant even
at 10% significant level. Outcome of governmental companies is significant at 1%
level and the value of influence is equal to -0.445 while tangibility of LSE compa-
nies is significant at 5% confidence level and is valued at -0.331. We have similar
results that Mazur (2007) had found in his work for all types of leverage. The
minus signs of regression results confirm our prediction of negative relationship
between tangibility and leverage but due to not significance of our results we can-
not accept the pecking order theory hypothesis for tangibility here.
Profitability
Profitability is negatively correlated with leverage as we expected. Moreover,
the profitability influences the leverage ratio at high level of -0.691 while the p-
value is equal to 0. The negative sign means that companies prefer to use internal
financial resources. The reason of such finding is that most of the firms in Kaza-
khstan have positive EBITDA value and they can use internal profits to increase
the value of their companies. Again, the profitability sign is minus for governmen-
tal and non-governmental companies. The change of profitability will decrease
the leverage ratio by 0.45 for non-governmental companies and 0.673 for govern-
mental companies these values are significant at 1% level. The higher impact of
profitability in state over private owned companies supports our assumption that
governmental companies being big mining companies have better EBITDA in com-
pare with private companies mainly working in retail or transportation industries
with relatively low depreciation rate. At the same time profitability of LSE com-
panies has positive influence on financial leverage, but this influence is not sta-
tistically significant at 10% level. We support the findings of Kaur and Rao (2009)
which also demonstrated the negative relationship between profitability and lever-
21
age while their results are also statistically significant. So, we accept the hypothesis
of pecking order theory regarding the influence of profitability for main regression
as well as governmental and non-governmental companies, but we reject the hy-
pothesis for LSE companies.
EBITDA margin
The relationship of EBITDA margin with financial leverage is positive but small
and equals 0.007 for both main leverage and non-governmental companies. For
LSE companies the relationship is negative -0.386 which contradicts our hypothe-
sis. All these results are statistically significant at 5% level. We cannot say anything
about the relationship between EBITDA margin and leverage of governmental
companies due to statistical insignificance of this result. We support the findings
of Mazur (2007) regarding positive correlation of EBITDA margin and leverage of
main and non-governmental companies. We accept the hypothesis for main lever-
age and leverage of private companies while reject hypothesis for LSE companies.
Asset utilization
The companies in Kazakhstan have demonstrated good value of asset turnover.
More than 10% of observations have asset utilization coefficient more than 1. That
means that yearly revenue of the company exceeds the total assets which tells
about the excellent financial results. Generally, such companies are focused to earn
money not from capital allocation but using new technologies or human capital.
In our sample companies with asset utilization coefficient more than 1 represent
telecommunications or retail sectors. Moreover, asset utilization coefficient more
than 0.5 tells that company has positive net earnings which become a source of fur-
ther financing which will lead the decrease the leverage ratio and the following the
pecking order theory. As a result, asset utilization has demonstrated the negative
relationship with leverage. Moreover, all these values are statistically significant
at 1% level. The total leverage will fall by 18.7% while asset utilization has higher
negative influence on state-owned companies leverage and the change is equal to
19%. LSE companies have also big negative relationship between asset utilization
and financial leverage and equal to -47.6%. On the other hand, state companies
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demonstrated small positive impact which is not significant even at 10% confi-
dence level. These results are identical as Kaur and Rao (2009) have found on the
example of Indian companies. We accept the hypotheses of negative relationship
between asset utilization and the financial leverage.
Dividend policy
We have found that dividends payment ratio is lower for companies under gov-
ernmental management. This result is interesting because we assumed that such
companies will pay higher dividends for the benefit of “Samruk Kazyna” fund but
we have found that governmental companies prefer to reinvest their revenues to
special projects or to increase the own equity. We got that dividends have positive
impact on total leverage and its value is equal to 0.264. At the same time the re-
sults for governmental, non-governmental and LSE companies are not significant.
Most of the results being statistically insignificant support the findings of Al-Najjar
(2011). We accept the hypothesis of positive connection between dividend policy
and total leverage ratio but reject the hypothesis for state-owned, private and LSE
companies.
Free cash flow
We have found that 17% of observations have negative value of FCF. This re-
sult is not good in terms of financial management and tells about the impossibility
of this portion of companies to use internal resources as a source of financing.
The value of influence is negative and equal to -0.073 for governmental firms and
higher influence of -0.824 for LSE companies but positive for non-governmental
companies 0.13 and a little bit smaller for total leverage or 0.018. From statistical
side, FCF has demonstrated insignificant regression results for all other types of
companies. Comparable with my findings, Akhtar and Oliver (2009) on the ex-
ample of Japanese companies have found the unimportance of free cash flow to
leverage ratio. We underline the insignificance of the relationship between free
cash flow and leverage ratio and reject the hypothesis of negative influence of FCF
to leverage ratios.
Liquidity
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Liquidity coefficient more than 1 tells about the ability of the company to freely
pay its short-term obligations by realizing its current assets. The situation when
80% of observations have liquidity coefficient higher than 1 and moreover there
are 28 observation which have the coefficient more than 10, demonstrate that such
companies could follow the hierarchy in financing. The hypotheses of negative as-
sociation of liquidity ratio is accepted for total leverage ratio which equals to -0.02,
-0.092 for governmental firms, a little bit smaller or -0.021 for non-governmental
companies and higher influence of -0.094 for LSE companies. At the same time,
these relationships are relatively small. Liquidity ratio is significant for companies
from Kazakhstan when the regression demonstrated that p-value lies within 1%
confidence interval. Empirical findings of Mazur (2007) support that the increase
of liquid assets will lead to the decline of leverage ratio which defines the nega-
tive relationship between two variables. These lead that we accept the hypothesis
regarding the negative relationship between liquidity ratio for all types of compa-
nies.
Size
Size is very specific determinant because there is no single way to measure the
company as a big, medium or small business. We define the size of the company
only by local description as company considering big in Kazakhstan are not big in
the US for example. The number of big companies in my sample is less that the
number of small companies. Only one third of the total number of companies in
my sample can be considered as big while other are medium businesses. We did
not include small companies because generally such companies are not presented
in stock exchange. Statistically, the impact of size is not significant even at 10% con-
fidence level for main leverage. On the other hand, the impact of size is statistically
significant for governmental companies at 1% level being in majority the big busi-
nesses. Non-governmental companies in majority being medium-sized companies
are also significant at 1% level. But the influence of size is positive and equivalent
to 0.014 and 0.019 respectively. Similar small positive relationship was predicted
by the Wang, Zheng and Yao (2009) on the example of Chinese companies. Com-
24
panies listed in LSE are generally big, and regression demonstrates that results are
statistically significant at 10% significance level. Having such findings, we reject
the hypothesis of pecking order theory regarding the negative influence of size.
Size of companies in Kazakhstan have reverse relationship to leverage ratio.
Ownership
We have found that government provided financial assistance to some big state-
owned monopoly companies during the financial crisis of 2008-2009 and during
the fall of oil prices in 2014. This assistance was not considered as a liability and
cannot be counted to the increase of leverage ratio. So, the management of these
monopolies was not totally relied to external financing and this financial aid from
the “Samruk Kazyna” helped some companies to improve their balance sheets.
The regression has demonstrated that the influence of state ownership to the lever-
age ratio is statistically significant at 1% level and equals to -0.078. As we have
predicted the influence of state is negative to the level of leverage. We accept our
hypothesis of negative impact of state ownership to the leverage ratio.
Overall, we accept the hypotheses for liquidity, profitability, asset utilization
and ownership. Also, we accept the hypothesis for tangibility for governmen-
tal and LSE companies while rejects for main and non-governmental companies
leverage ratio. We accept the hypothesis of positive correlation between EBITDA
margin and leverage for main regression and non-governmental companies while
reject for LSE companies. Again, we accept the hypothesis of dividend policy de-
terminant for main and governmental companies’ regressions. The results of rela-
tionship between leverage and FCF are not statistically significant, and we cannot
consider this variable in evaluation of debt-to-equity ratio. Finally, we reject the
hypothesis for the relationship between size and leverage.
7 Discussion
The choice of capital structure is very important in terms of risk and future per-
formance of the firm. In this section we want to describe the financial decisions of
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Kazakhstani companies in the period of sample, to analyze the cost of financing
and to discuss the importance of the study of capital structure.
Despite we are facing only 10-year period of the survey (2007-2016) we can
divide this cycle into several periods in terms of the development of financial mar-
kets in Kazakhstan. In the past decade business sector in Kazakhstan faced several
shocks which resulted the downturn of activity. Beginning from 2000 the econ-
omy in Kazakhstan started restoring from ruins of the 90th. Financial markets and
banking system was undeveloped around the turn of the century but this sector
skyrocketed in the mid of the first decade of XXI century and reaching its peak in
2007. Non-financial sectors of the economy grew as well by taking huge loans and
not considering potential financial risks. As a result, financial crisis of 2008-2009
deprived many companies of their income and big portion of loans became non-
refundable. This caused the bankruptcy of many small and medium businesses
while big companies from energy sector being quasi-national gained financial help
from the government. The policy of frivolous loans were left behind, and compa-
nies began to manage their financial risks. For example, starting from 2008 almost
all national companies created the department of risk management or hired finan-
cial controllers that were obliged to manage the leverage ratio and the structure of
liabilities. This step improved the situation with the leverage ratio when in 2009
the average leverage ratio from my sample was 58% while in 2011 this coefficient
reduced till 48% and remained constant till the next crisis of 2014-2015 when the
ratio of leverage increased till 57% in 2015. In this period companies especially in
oil and gas industry challenged serious financial troubles where some companies
faced negative net cash flow and need to take external loans to manage financial
gaps.
In addition, Kazakhstan’s economy being classified as developing and as a re-
sult having low credit rating according to world famous credit-rating agencies has
no access to cheap loans. Taking loans in Kazakhstan is costly even in the periods
of financial stability. According to the National Statistical Agency the cost of aver-
age loan to open new business in 2016 varies in the diapason of 15-17%. Moreover,
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the base rate of the National bank of Kazakhstan increased in the periods of crisis
reaching 11% in 2008 and 2016. It is very clear that doing business is problematic
in such conditions. So, the cost and the source of financing becomes extremely
important in this circumstance.
Without a doubt, leverage ratio influences many financial indicators and the
whole value of the company. Considering the importance of risk management and
financial planning, the main findings of pecking order theory become relevant.
8 Conclusion
The prime goal of this research was to study the variables that we considered may
influence the capital structure decisions. Thus, the fairness of pecking order theory
was empirically tested whether it is applicable in companies from Kazakhstan.
We can classify the estimated results into two main groups:
The first group combines the determinants that confirms the principles of the
hierarchy in financing:
• The estimation results indicate that profitability, asset utilization, liquidity
and ownership are negatively related to leverage. The minus sign of these vari-
ables meets the predicted sign and we can say that assumptions of pecking order
theory work for these variables;
• Tangibility coefficient follows general hypothesis regarding negative relation-
ship to leverage ratio. But, this coefficient is not statistically significant for both
total and non-governmental companies’ regressions. But overall, we accept the
hypothesis of negative influence of tangibility to leverage;
• Concurrently, dividend policy coefficient is predicted to be positively corre-
lated with leverage. In fact, it is true only for main regression and for governmen-
tal companies. We can conclude that dividend policy follows the predictions of
pecking order theory;
• EBITDA margin follows the pecking order theory hypothesis for main and
non-governmental companies leverage regressions. At the same time, it rejects the
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hypothesis for LSE companies.
The second group includes the independent variables that due to statistical in-
significance of regression results or such that have the deviations with predicted
hypotheses are not associated with the postulates of pecking order theory.
• The regression results have demonstrated that FCF coefficient is totally not
significant for all types of financial leverages. This is clear now why many authors
did not include this variable for testing the pecking order theory. And only the
work of Lopez-Garcia and Sogorb-Mira (2008) consist of this determinant while
Akhtar and Oliver (2009) and Mazur (2007) omitted it due to statistical insignifi-
cance;
• The results of size coefficient are statistically significant, but it contradicts the
hypothetical negative relationship with leverage. We reject the hypothesis of size
determinant. After receiving the following results, we can conclude that:
•Actual negative relation between capital structure choice and the profitability
demonstrated us that firms tend to not increase their liabilities because this re-
duces its future profits. Many firms rely on own undistributed earnings to finance
company’s projects or increase value of the company.
• Direct state control in a big portion of companies have no negative effect in
terms of financial management. Despite our assumption about the indifference of
the capital structure in such companies, the financial decisions in national com-
panies in Kazakhstan are inclined to minimize financial risks and rely on internal
sources. On the other hand, these companies are the drivers in the Kazakhstan’s
economy and being big monopolies, they demonstrate good financial results.
Theoretical implications in cope with our empirical findings can assist finan-
cial managers in applying the capital structure decisions. The reality has demon-
strated that some companies are taking serious risks by increasing their liabilities
up to 100% while other companies prefer to rely only on own sources. The find-
ings proved the use of diversification in the sources of financing but following the
hierarchy in order not to take unnecessary risks. We have found that companies
from Kazakhstan on average follow financial leverage rate of 0.5 which allows to
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maximize their profits while taking adequate risks.
Finally, after analyzing the received results we can conclude that companies
from Kazakhstan partially follow the pecking order theory. Half of our hypotheses
was confirmed but on the other side some assumptions had been violated.
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Table 3: Main, government, non-government and LSE regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Main Government Non-Gov LSE
tangibility -0.024 -0.445*** 0.007 -0.331***
(0.037) (0.048) (0.046) (0.096)
profitability -0.691*** -0.673*** -0.450** 0.732
(0.160) (0.159) (0.219) (0.503)
ebitda_margin 0.007** -0.006 0.007** -0.386**
(0.003) (0.056) (0.003) (0.184)
asset_uti -0.187*** 0.023 -0.190*** -0.476**
(0.039) (0.050) (0.043) (0.212)
dividend 0.264*** 0.113** -105.631 23.575
(0.056) (0.056) (74.114) (22.024)
FCF 0.018 -0.073 0.130 -0.824
(0.166) (0.111) (0.252) (0.691)
liquidity -0.020*** -0.092*** -0.021*** -0.094***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.012)
size 0.007 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.022*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012)
ownership -0.078***
(0.022)
Constant 0.635*** 0.792*** 0.411*** 1.004***
(0.092) (0.074) (0.126) (0.181)
Observations 349 117 232 28
R-squared 0.274 0.706 0.226 0.771
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Summary statistics
VARIABLES Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
lev 349 0.509 0.226 0.098 0.99
lev_gov 117 0.484 0.207 0.098 0.99
lev_nongov 232 0.522 0.234 0.098 0.95
lev_lse 28 0.499 0.238 0.084 0.922
tangibility 349 0.613 0.303 0.001 2.103
profitability 349 0.052 0.081 -0.171 0.5
ebitda_margin 349 0.489 2.578 -1.872 19.622
asset_uti 349 0.481 0.342 0 1.524
dividend 349 0.014 0.099 -0.024 1.629
FCF 349 0.031 0.077 -0.262 0.432
liquidit 349 4.165 4.506 0.004 23.379
size 349 16.276 2.39 10.079 21.104
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Table 5: Main Financial Information - Samruk Kazyna
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
KASE capitalization 756.9 663.9 386.5 878.7 789.0 686.7 604.9 506.1 1094.6 1240.1
Share of Samruk-Kazyna 18% 22% 43% 20% 21% 26% 36% 49% 31% 31%
Balance Sheet:
Current Assets 54.6 49.9 61.5 73.7 67.2 85.7 74.3 105.5 193.1 231.5
Long-term Assets 78.7 97.5 103.6 99.3 95.4 96.3 146.4 143.9 149.9 152.3
Current Liabilities 62.2 59.8 65.1 74.4 69.9 72.3 115.8 107.4 194.6 205.8
Long-term Liabilities 30.3 40.4 47.4 53.6 43.3 55.7 50.6 73.1 74.8 75.2
Equity 41 47.3 52.5 44.9 49.3 53.8 54.3 69.2 73.6 102.7
Total Balance 133.4 147.5 165.1 172.9 162.5 181.9 220.7 249.5 343.1 383.8
Income Statement:
Revenue 16.4 26.1 22.5 26.7 32.4 38.8 34.4 41.4 46.1 51.9
EBITDA 2.8 2.5 -6.4 -0.4 -2.2 2.3 4.7 1.3 5.8 6.2
Net Income 2.3 2.2 -6.2 0.07 -2.1 4.2 4.8 -2.3 2.9 4.7
Cash-Flow Statement:
Capital Expenditures 1.3 2.7 4.0 3.2 2.5 2.9 4.2 5.4 5.3 6.1
Dividends Paid 0.2 0.5 0.4 1.3 1.4 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.8 1.4
Depreciation 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.8
Net CF 11.8 0.7 11.2 6.1 -13.7 10.2 -6.8 5.7 12.9 12.4
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Appendix 4
The results of lag-order selection statistics for series of vector autoregressions
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